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Firstly, I analyse the European legislation on asylum, the so-called “Dublin System”, finding three 
main issues affecting it a) the allocation of refugees between Member States; b) the differences between 
Member States in the treatment of asylum seekers and asylum applications; and c) the differences in the 
rights granted to the refugee status across Member States. I also show that these issues have serious 
consequences for both asylum seekers and refugees. Secondly, we examine the European Agenda on 
Migration that represents the official response of the EU to the present crisis. Finally, I present some 
proposal aimed to improve the European managing of refugees and asylum seekers. Following a 
moderated cosmopolitan approach, I propose the establishment of a limited citizenship for refugees that 
might be thought as a temporary citizenship conditioned to the possession of the refugee status. At this 
particular citizenship, one may apply different rights, but to face the issues encountered, it may be 
sufficient to connect to it only the freedom of movement and residence throughout the EU. I argue that 
such a policy would have several advantages and could at least partially solve the issues present in the 
European asylum policy. 
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Questo articolo, in primo luogo, analizza il cosiddetto "Sistema di Dublino", la normativa europea in 
materia di asilo, riscontrando tre problemi principali che la interessano: a) la ripartizione dei profughi tra 
Stati Membri; b) le differenze tra gli Stati Membri nel trattamento dei richiedenti asilo e nelle procedure 
per la domanda di asilo; c) le differenze tra Stati Membri dei diritti concessi e garantiti allo status di 
rifugiato. Questi problemi hanno gravi conseguenze sia per i richiedenti asilo che per i rifugiati. In 
secondo luogo, l’articolo esamina l'Agenda Europea sulle Migrazioni che rappresenta la risposta ufficiale 
dell'UE alla crisi attuale. Infine, presentiamo alcune proposte volte a migliorare la gestione europea dei 
rifugiati e dei richiedenti asilo. Seguendo un approccio cosmopolita “moderato”, l’articolo propone la 
creazione di una cittadinanza “limitata” per i rifugiati. Essa potrebbe essere pensata come una 
cittadinanza temporanea condizionata al possesso dello status di rifugiato. A questa cittadinanza sui 
generis potrebbero essere riconosciuti diversi diritti, ma per affrontare i problemi riscontrati, potrebbe 
essere sufficiente riconoscere soltanto la libertà di circolazione e di soggiorno in tutta l'UE. In 
conclusione, l’articolo sostiene che una tale politica avrebbe una serie di vantaggi e potrebbe almeno in 
parte risolvere i problemi presenti nella politica europea in materia di asilo. 
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1.	  Introduction	  
Due to the growth of asylum seekers’ flows arriving into European territory, the evident 
inability of the EU to effectively answer the problem, and the increased interest shown by 
public opinion to the images of suffering and death that accompany asylum seekers trying to 
reach EU soil, the immigration and asylum subjects, in the last year, become central in the 
European political debate. 
Asylum seekers’ flows, having remained quite stable from 1990 to 2010, have started to 
grow following the Arab Spring and the consequent destabilization of the North African region. 
Further increases have been registered following the Libyan civil war, and the Western military 
intervention ended with the death of Muammar Qaddafi, which leaved the country highly 
divided, and without a central government able to control the entire territory and its borders. 
Yet, only with the onset of the Syrian civil war, between the end of 2011 and the beginning of 
2012, and the advance of radical fighting groups (such as al-Nursa and Daesh) between 2013 
and 2014, the flows of asylum seekers started to increase dramatically.  
As reported by the UNHCR, in 2014, the number of asylum seekers in industrialized 
countries has been the highest of the last decades, with a total of 866.000 applications1, 
registering an increase of 45% compared to 2013. Although it is not the only factor, war is 
without doubt a key variable in explaining the phenomenon. Based on Eurostat data, Table 1 
shows the number of asylum applications submitted to the EU, divided by asylum seekers’ 
country of origin. The data show the top ten countries of origin from which the EU received 
applications in 2014. 
As we can see, the data show that the top ten countries of origin are responsible for the 
61.64% of the total applications presented in 2014. In addition, they show that countries of 
origin share the presence of authoritarian regimes, or are experiencing (or have recently 
experienced) violent conflicts. Syria, where a particularly violent civil war is ongoing since 
2011, accounts for the 19.29% of the total asylum applications. 
According to the data published by the European Commission, at European level, the first 
six months of 2015 saw 400.000 applications registered, compared to 600.000 registered 
throughout the whole of 2014. This data on asylum seeking show how the EU is facing one of 
the major humanitarian crisis since the end of the Balkan wars in 1995. 
This situation has shown the limits of the Dublin System — created in 1999 and reformed in 
its subsequent versions as Dublin II and Dublin III — which were supposed to harmonize 
European policies and minimum standards on the assessment and treatment of asylum seekers. 
Some of the inefficiencies affecting EU asylum policy had been already denounced in 2011 by 
southern European states, overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, which have been the main theatre 
of landings and deaths caused by the sinking of boats.  
 
                                                
 1 UNHCR report on asylum seekers applications in 2014: https://www.unhcr.it/news/raggiunto-il-piu-
elevato-numero-di-rifugiati-degli-ultimi-22-anni-a-causa-delle-guerre-in-siria-e-iraq 
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Table	   1:	   Top	   ten	   countries	   by	   number	   of	   asylum	   applications	   (absolute	   values),	   divided	   by	  
country	  of	  origin	  of	  the	  applicant,	  presented	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  2014.	  
	  
N°	   Country	   2014	  
1	   Syria	   127,940	  
2	   Eritrea	   46,730	  
3	   Afghanistan	   42,700	  
4	   Kosovo	   38,450	  
5	   Serbia	   31,180	  
6	   Pakistan	   22,360	  
7	   Iraq	   21,870	  
8	   Nigeria	   21,235	  
9	   Russia	   20,235	  
10	   Somalia	   18,135	  
	   Total	  number	  of	  applications	  from	  the	  top	  ten	  countries	   408835	  
	   Total	  Applications	  –	  2014	   663240	  
	   Top	  ten	  countries	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	   61.64%	  
Source:	   Eurostat:	   http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?mode=view&code=migr_asydcfsta	   [Accessed	  
on	  10	  January	  2016]	  
 
The causes of the failure of EU immigration and asylum policies (which we will analyse in 
depth in the next sections) has multiple roots that require a multi-layer analysis. Bad 
management and scarcity of funds, significant disparities across Member States in the 
management of the asylum applications, as well as the disparity of rights associated with the 
status of refugee in different countries, and the inability to agree on a European common 
management of the international crisis, are just some of the factors that contributed to this 
failure. 
This failure was revealed in its most brutal form with the high number of deaths recorded 
among asylum seekers in early 2015. One of the emblems of this tragedy is the story of Aylan 
Kurdi, a Syrian child found drowned on a Turkish beach, whose picture was reported by media 
all over the world. 
These deaths have shaken public opinion, as well as prompting the European institutions, 
and EU Member States, to start a serious debate about what measures to adopt to face the crisis, 
at both domestic and European level. However, the debate still shows the divisions between 
Member States with respect to the general approach to immigration.  
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While some of them, such as Germany, have shown more attention towards proposing 
solutions that (despite unfeasibility in the long run) may face the emergence in the short term, 
others have shown no will to discuss any solutions. Hungary has championed this non-
collaborative approach, leading to the decision to construct a wall on the Serbian border to 
contain the migration flows, and the Austrian Government has announced the construction of a 
barrier along the Slovenian border. 
However, refugees and asylum seekers are not just a European problem. Asylum has a global 
nature that affects all regions of the world. As mentioned, at the international level the issue of 
refugees and asylum seekers is governed by the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the Protocol 
on the Status of Refugees of 1967. To date, 143 states have ratified both documents while 2 
States (St. Kitts and Nevis and Madagascar) have only ratified the Convention and 3 States 
(Cape Verde, the United States and Venezuela) only the Protocol. Figure 1 shows a summary of 
the signatory States of the two documents. 
 
Figure	   1:	   Map	   of	   the	   signatory	   countries	   of	   the	   Geneva	   Convention	   of	   1951	   and	   the	   1967	  
Protocol	  on	  Refugees	  
 
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration:	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees	  (UNHCR).	  States	  Parties	  
to	   the	   1951	   Convention	   and	   its	   1967	   Protocol.	   UNHCR.	   URL:	   http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html.	  
[Accessed	  on	  10	  January	  2016]	  
	  
The two documents set out the minimum criteria for accepting a person as a refugee. 
However, the states retain substantial freedom with respect to how they practically grant 
international protection, and which rights they associate to that status. 
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According to UNHCR estimates globally, in 2013, 10.7 million people were forced to leave 
their homes. Of these, 8.2 million people found refuge within the borders of their own country, 
while 2.5 million were new refugees2. 
At the end of 2013, UNHCR estimated that, worldwide, there were 16.7 million refugees and 
1.2 million asylum seekers. The countries of origin of these individuals are various; however, 
the top three were Afghanistan (2.56 million), Syria (2.47 million) and Somalia (1.12 million), 
which amounted about to half of the world's total refugees3. 
Regarding host countries, according to UNHCR, those receiving the largest number of 
refugees belong to the developing regions of the world. In 2013, developing countries received 
86% of refugees, while the more developed areas of the world received the remaining 14%. 
Figure 2 shows which countries have received the largest number of refugees. 
 
Figure	  2:	  Ranking	  of	  countries	  receiving	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  refugees	  worldwide	  
  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  on	  data	  from	  the	  UNHCR	  Global	  Trends	  Report	  2013	  
 
In conclusion, the problem of refugees and asylum seekers predominantly affects developing 
areas of the word. In addition, considering the international scenario, and especially the Middle 
East situation, it is legitimate to expect that the current emergency is likely to continue rather 
than diminishing over the next few years. These considerations suggest the need to develop an 
international wide-ranging strategy able to manage more effectively the humanitarian situation 
of those millions of people, which are forced to flee their countries to escape war, or conditions 
of serious and systematic violations of human rights. 
2.	  Legislation	  on	  Asylum	  
The legal institution of asylum is rooted in a long Western tradition. In ancient Rome, 
according to the reports of Plutarch, a sacred place was set up under the protection of the God 
                                                
2 UNHCR Global Trends Report 2013. 
3 Ibidem.	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Asylum, where fugitives (slaves, religious and political persecuted people) could be welcomed 
and find shelter from their persecutors. 
However, until the 1950s, when two important documents were signed (the Geneva 
Convention on Refugees (1951), and the European Convention of Human Rights (1950)), the 
right to asylum was still inextricably linked to the authority exercising its power on the places of 
asylum (the gods, the Church or the State). Therefore, it was simply the consequence of the 
"sovereignty" exercised on those sites. Successively, instead, another more revolutionary 
significance of asylum, as an institution capable of responding to the necessity to protect 
individual human rights, was developed (Cherubini, 2014). Both Conventions, however, were a 
consequence of the Second World War, and were created to address the problems relative to 
those people that was displaced during the conflict. For this reason, initially, moreover for what 
concerns the Convention of Geneva, it regarded mainly the European contest, and was not 
structured to respond to mass exodus. 
But the changes occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, in which the traditional 
conflicts between States have been almost completely replaced by internal conflicts and civil 
wars for political control, made a compelling case for making asylum an instrument for urgent 
action, and for mass exodus emergencies. 
According to the international law, an asylum seeker is a person who, having left his/her 
country, applies for the recognition of refugee status or other forms of international protection4. 
Until the competent authorities of the country of application make a final decision, the person is 
an asylum seeker and is granted as such the right to stay legally in that country, even if he/she 
entered without a regular visa. However, states maintain the right to regulate the procedures for 
examining the applications and the permanence of asylum seekers and refugees. 
Asylum seekers should not be confused with economic migrants who decide to emigrate for 
personal reasons, usually economic ones. The latter are essentially individuals who enter a 
country with a tourist visa, or illegally, in search of better living conditions and economic 
opportunities. Asylum seeker instead, regardless of how he/she enters a country, is a person that 
is entitled to benefit from international protection, by the country in which he/she submits an 
application, because of serious situations of war, severe and systematic violations of human 
rights or persecutions, either political or personal, suffered in the origin country. For instance, 
an individual that asks international protection being a homosexual escaping from a country in 
which homosexuality is punished by the death penalty, or a whistle-blower who having 
disclosed secrets and compromising governmental documents seeks protection abroad to avoid 
retaliation from its own state (Santoro, tbp). 
The	  Dublin	  System	  
At a European level, in addition to international obligations imposed on Member States, the 
right to asylum is reinforced both by primary and secondary legislation adopted by the 
                                                
4 See the definition provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights UNHCR. 
URL: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html 
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European institutions. According to Article 18 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
"the right of asylum is guaranteed in compliance with the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the 
Protocol of 1967"5, while the principle of non-refoulment — potential refugees cannot be 
deported if there is a possibility that they would suffer persecution — is guaranteed by Article 
19 of the Charter. The Protocol of 1967, was aimed to overcome some issues emerged from the 
Convention and to adapt it to the changes occurred in the world. With the Protocol temporal and 
geographical limitations has been eliminated and, therefore, the area of application has been 
extended.  
However, both the Charter and the Protocol do not contain any mechanism to facilitate the 
arrival of asylum seekers, which in fact do not have a valid visa at their arrival and are so forced 
to enter Europe illegally, taking significant risks. Therefore, the acquis of the European asylum 
law becomes applicable only from the moment when the asylum seeker physically arrives in the 
territory of a Member State. 
The so-called "Dublin system" is a cornerstone in the EU asylum policy and enforced in all 
28 Member States as well as in Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. The Dublin 
Convention, signed in 1990 and entered into force in 1997, established the principle that a 
single Member State should be responsible for processing an asylum application, and outlines 
the criteria for determining which state should have this responsibility. This tool was created 
with the purpose of containing phenomena such as so-called "asylum shopping", i.e. asylum 
seekers simultaneously presenting their applications in several Member States. Dublin II, 
introduced in 2003 as a Regulation, defines the hierarchical criteria to determine which state is 
responsible for processing the application, while Dublin III expands the guarantees for asylum 
seekers, and clarifies the rules and obligations on them. A summary of the key components of 
the "Dublin system" is shown in Table 2. 
In essence, the Dublin Convention, as amended by subsequent modifications, aims to 
establish a set of rules that allow better management of asylum applications through a regulation 
that establishes clearly and unequivocally which State is competent for examining any single 
application. 
In principle, the Convention provides that the Member State competent for examining the 
asylum application is that of the "first arrival" of the applicant, introducing some exceptions, 
mainly but not limited to family reunion, which derogate from this rule. 
The need to ensure that asylum seekers have uniform protection across the EU and to offer 
fair and reasonable application procedures led — starting from 1999 — to the development of 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The "Dublin system" integrates into this most 
complex system. Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
provides for the establishment of the CEAS with the main objective of reducing the disparities 
between Member States in the procedures for examining the applications. 
 
                                                
5 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 18. 
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Table	  2:	  The	  Dublin	  System	  Regulations	  
The	  “Dublin	  System”	  
Regulation	   Entry	  into	  
force	  
Principal	  content	  
Dublin	  Convention	  
(97/C	  254/01)	   1997	  
Establishes	   the	   criteria	   to	   determine	   which	   Member	   State	  
should	   be	   responsible	   for	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   asylum	  
application.	   Under	   the	   Convention,	   the	   responsible	   Member	  
State	   has	   several	   obligations,	   including	   examining	   the	   asylum	  
application	   and	   that	   of	   taking	   charge	   of	   the	   applicant	   goes	  
illegally	  to	  another	  Member	  State.	  
Dublin	  II	  
(No.	  343/2003)	   2003	  
Replaces	   the	   Dublin	   Convention,	   re-­‐establishing	   the	   principle	  
that	   only	   one	   Member	   State	   is	   responsible	   for	   examining	   an	  
asylum	   application.	   It	   defines	   more	   clearly	   the	   hierarchical	  
criteria	   to	   establish	   the	   Member	   State	   responsible	   for	   each	  
asylum	   application,	   such	   as	   family	   considerations,	   recent	  
possession	   of	   visa	   or	   residence	   permit	   and,	   whether	   the	  
applicant	  has	  entered	  EU	  irregularly	  or	  regularly.	  
Dublin	  III	  
(No.	  694/2013)	   2013	  
Based	  on	  the	  same	  principles	  as	   the	  two	  previous	  regulations,	  
but	   it	   extends	   the	   safeguards	   for	   asylum	   seekers	   and	   clarifies	  
rules	   and	   responsibilities	   of	   Member	   States,	   including	   which	  
state	   should	   bear	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   application.	  With	   Dublin	   III,	  
there	   is	   a	   possibility	   of	   appealing	   a	   transfer	   decision.	   In	  
addition,	   a	   new	   clause	   states	   that	   a	   Member	   State	   is	   not	  
allowed	  to	  transfer	  a	  person	  to	  another	  Member	  State,	  if	  there	  
is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  person	  will	  be	  in	  “risk	  of	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  
treatment.”	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  on:	  Dublin	  Convention.	  	  
URL:	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/legal-­‐content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819%2801%29&from=IT;	  
Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  343/2003.	  	  
URL:	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:050:0001:0010:EN:PDF,	  and	  
Regulation	  (EU)	  No	  604/2013.	  	  
URL:	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:PDF.	  
Table	  3:	  Common	  European	  Asylum	  System	  (CEAS) 
Common	  European	  Asylum	  System	  (CEAS)	  
EU	  Legislation	   Objective	  
	  
Asylum	  Procedures	  
Directive	  
	  
2005/85/EC	  
Establishes	   common	   standards	   of	   safeguards	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	  
disparities	  between	  national	  examining	  procedures	  amongst	  Member	  
States.	   It	   guarantees	  access	   to	  a	   fair	   and	  efficient	   asylum	  procedure,	  
and	  sets	  out	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  whole	  process	  of	  claiming	  asylum.	  	  
Reception	  Conditions	  
Directive	  
	  
2003/9/EC	  
Establishes	   the	   minimum	   common	   reception	   conditions	   such	   as	  
housing,	  food	  and	  employment,	  which	  Member	  States	  are	  required	  to	  
grant	   to	   asylum	   seekers	  whilst	   processing	   applications.	   The	  Directive	  
limits	  asylum	  applicants’	  secondary	  movements.	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Qualification	  Directive	  
	  
2011/95/EU	  
Clarifies	   the	   grounds	   for	   granting	   international	   protection.	   It	   also	  
establishes	   the	   content	   of	   the	   protection	   granted	   to	   these	   persons	  
from	  refoulment	  to	  access	  to	  education,	  accommodation	  and	  medical	  
care.	  
Dublin	  Regulation	  
	  
No.	  604/2013	  
Establishes	   which	   Member	   State	   is	   responsible	   for	   examining	   the	  
application,	   and	   clarifies	   the	   rules	   governing	   the	   relations	   between	  
States.	  	  
EURODAC	  Regulation	  
	  
No.	  2725/2000	  
Establishes	   an	   EU	   asylum	   fingerprint	   database,	   making	   it	   easier	   to	  
determine	  which	  Member	  State	  is	  responsible	  for	  examining	  individual	  
applications.	  	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  on:	  Council	  Directive	  2005/85/EC.	  	  
URL:	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:326:0013:0034:EN:PDF;	  
European	  Parliament	  and	  Council	  Directive	  2011/95/Eu.	  	  
URL:	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:337:0009:0026:en:PDF;	  Council	  
Directive	  2003/9/EC.	  	  
URL:	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:031:0018:0025:En:PDF,	  
European	  Parliament	  and	  Council	  Directive	  604/2013.	  	  
URL:	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/legal-­‐content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&from=EN,	  and	  
Council	  Regulation	  2725/2000.	  	  
URL:	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000R2725:EN:HTML	  	  
3.	  The	  European	  Legislation’s	  Gaps	  	  
The idea that the "Dublin system" has failed because it was unable to carry out its task of 
efficiently managing refugees has become a common opinion (Guild et al., 2015). Created in 
order to introduce common rules allowing to determine objectively which states should take 
charge of every single application for asylum, to prevent phenomena such as ''asylum shopping” 
and “asylum seekers in orbit”6, the Dublin System entered into crisis as a result of the increase 
in migration flows following the Arab Spring and the subsequent instability of that area. 
The current European asylum system suffers from a number of issues that, despite the 
changes made over the decades, continue to persist and to affect both the Member States, the 
EU as a whole, and the asylum seekers. The problems regarding the Dublin system can be 
divided into those affecting the legal level and those affecting its implementation. From the 
legal point of view, although fairly comprehensive in its legislation, which in theory covers all 
aspects of the process of seeking asylum (the Qualification Directive), the procedures pertaining 
to states and European institutions (Asylum Procedures Directive) and the minimum reception 
standards to be offered to asylum seekers and refugees (Reception Conditions Directive), the 
Dublin system actually has significant gaps. They are: 
The asylum seekers allocation in EU Member States: making it mandatory to submit the 
application for international protection, and consequently the compulsory residence in case the 
                                                
6 The fact that the applicant was sent from one Member State to another without anyone being declared 
competent for the examination of its application. 
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application is accepted, in the first country of arrival, generates unbearable disparities in asylum 
flows across Member States. 
From the point of view of its implementation, the Dublin system has two important gaps, 
namely: 
The differences between the Member States in the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers: 
Member States show huge disparities in managing asylum applications and in the treatment of 
applicants. These disparities are reflected in the request procedures, timing, and outcome; 
The differences between the Member States with respect to the rights granted to those with 
refugee status: Member States have a strong autonomy in choosing which rights are granted to 
those with refugee status and thus, again, this causes disparities between Member States. 
3.1	  Asylum	  Seeker	  and	  Refugee	  Allocation	  
By introducing the rule that only the state of first arrival should be responsible for examining 
an asylum application, the Dublin System has put greater pressure, both financial and social, on 
the Member States sharing the EU's external borders, such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Hungary. 
These states are those mostly exposed to the arrival of migrants, especially undocumented ones, 
and have in fact experienced a dramatic increase in the number of asylum applications 
submitted in their territory, the number of refugees who have died trying to reach their coasts, 
and in the cost of patrolling borders (which is only partially funded by the EU). In addition, the 
countries most affected by irregular arrivals have showed frustration from the part of both 
public opinion and governments, which in some cases has led to the adoption of non-virtuous 
and questionable behaviour. According to the Spiegel Online, Italian authorities have provided 
provisional documents to the potential asylum seekers facilitating them to reach other European 
countries, and in some cases, even providing the money needed to reach these places7. 
This kind of behaviour in violation of EU law was functional to both the Italian government 
and asylum seekers. On one side, Italy was able to reduce the number of applications to be 
examined with a considerable reduction in costs; on the other, asylum seekers have been able to 
reach destinations in which they would choose to present their applications. Italy is not the only 
country that has adopted questionable measures. In Hungary, as mentioned earlier, the 
government of President Viktor Orban has approved and completed the construction of a wall 
on the Serbian border, attempting to prevent asylum seeker arrivals, and is now building another 
barrier on the Croatian border. The construction of the second wall, moreover, is a much more 
serious fact because it is the first time in EU history that a Member State has built a barrier on 
another Member State’s border. 
Second, the Dublin regulation showed to be dysfunctional also from the refugees’ point of 
view. The system according to which the first Member State of arrival is responsible for 
examining asylum applications is based on the strong assumption that EU Member States 
                                                
7 Spiegel Online, (09 October 2013) Fortress Europe: How the EU Turns Its Back on Refugees. URL: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/asylum-policy-and-treatment-of-refugees-in-the-european-
union-a-926939.html 
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provide equal protection and equal criteria regarding the granting of asylum status, but data 
shows us that this assumption is not empirically sound. Looking at data relating to the 
applications presented in EU Member States and the rate of acceptance of applications (Figure 
3), we can see that there are indeed substantial differences. 
Figure	  3:	  Percentage	  of	  asylum	  applications	  accepted	  in	  2014	  in	  European	  Member	  States	  
 
Source:	  Authors’	  elaboration	  on	  Eurostat	  data.	  	  
URL:	  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-­‐
explained/index.php/File:First_instance_decisions_on_%28non	  
EU%29_asylum_applications,_2014_%28number,_rounded_figures%29_YB15_IV.png.	  	  
[Accessed	  on	  10	  January	  2016]	  
As shown by Figure 3, the application acceptance rate in 2014 considerably varied from 
1.2% in the case of Hungary to 93% in Malta with a European average of 29.3%. For this and 
for other reasons, such as the presence of community networks in another country, refugees 
often do not wish to present their applications in the first Member State of arrival. This means 
that in many cases refugees attempt to escape the registration of fingerprints and their personal 
data, provided by EU legislation and, if they succeed, often rely on criminal networks trying to 
reach the chosen country where present their asylum application (Day, 2015). 
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3.2	  Treatment	  of	  Asylum	  Seekers	  and	  Refugees	  
The problem of the differences between Member States in the treatment of asylum seekers 
and asylum applications and the differences in the rights granted refugees can be analysed 
together. Both in fact arise from the unrestrained autonomy left to the Member States in the 
application of European rules and, as we shall see, share the same consequences. 
However, a similar argument can be made regarding the treatment of asylum seekers and 
those who are granted refugee status. Despite EU attempts to make the rules more consistent 
through the Dublin System, substantial differences remain across Member States with respect to 
the procedures for the recognition of the status as well as with respect to the living conditions of 
refugees after the recognition of international protection. These differences, as shown briefly in 
2013 by Spiegel online, are reflected in several aspects including the time required to examine 
applications, housing conditions, health assistance and the possibility of integration following 
recognition of the status. The Spiegel article shows how applying for asylum in a Member State 
rather than another can make great difference for asylum seekers8. 
Concerning the timing, a survey carried out by Euractive shows in detail the significant 
differences in the examination of asylum applications between Member States, pointing out 
how they widely vary from a few months for Sweden, to one or two years in the case of Italy 
and France9. 
From the standpoint of reception conditions, the differences are even deeper. On the one 
hand, some Northern European countries such as UK, Sweden and Norway offer relatively high 
hosting standards; on the other hand, some Southern European countries like Italy have 
relatively poor standards. Once the refugee status is recognized, in Norway the state provides a 
well-structured assistance program lasting two years granting for access to housing, salary, 
language and professional courses, and a wide range of social and welfare services. In Italy, the 
lack of sufficient accommodation and investment, and the disorganization of the international 
protection system ensures that refugees are often forced to live in conditions of hardship and 
marginalization, in occupied structures or in tent camps (Povoledo, 2012).  
These differences clearly show that the assumption, at the base of the Dublin System, 
according to which all EU Member Countries offer comparable levels of international 
protection is untrue. 
4.	  Filling	  the	  Gap:	  The	  European	  Agenda	  on	  Migration	  
The strong increase in migration flows towards the EU and the number of lives lost in the 
attempt to reach Europe, or to cross the "borders" of its Member States, together with awareness 
with respect to the failure of the Dublin system in coping with the current crisis, have raised a 
                                                
8 Spiegel Online, (09 October 2013) Fortress Europe: How the EU Turns Its Back on Refugees. URL: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/asylum-policy-and-treatment-of-refugees-in-the-european-
union-a-926939.html. 
9 Euractive.com, (September 22, 2015). Asylum systems in Europe remain disparate. URL: 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/asylum-systems-europe-remain-disparate-317822. 
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fervent debate on the issue of asylum seeking and refugees within the European institutions, the 
governments of the Member States and public opinion. 
To try to understand the magnitude of the growth of interest in asylum seekers and refugee 
issues in recent years, we try to consider the number of articles, available online, containing the 
words "Refugees Europe". By using the search engine Google News, with which one can find 
all the articles contained in online newspapers, blogs and information websites, we have 
inserted the search key "Refugees Europe" and found the number of results returned, divided 
per year, from 2009 to 2015. 
Figure	  4:	  Number	  of	  results	  returned	  by	  the	  search	  key	  "Refugees	  Europe"	  for	  the	  years	  2009	  -­‐	  
2015	  
 
Source:	  author’s	  elaboration	  on	  data	  from	  the	  search	  engine	  Google	  News	  	  
 
As shown in Figure 4, the number of results paid to the search key in question, while 
increasing, steadily remained fairly stable until 2013, when it suffered an exponential increase 
which continued into 201510. 
The growing interest in migration issues and the intensification of the debate have pushed 
European institutions to seek short and long-term solutions whose main objective is to bridge 
the gaps in European legislation and its application. 
While Member States, as mentioned earlier, have tried to respond to the crisis in very 
different ways, some adopting one time "extraordinary" solutions, other total rejection (and 
even suspending the Schengen Treaty and reintroducing border controls or temporarily blocks), 
the European Commission has approved the so-called European Agenda on Migration. The 
Agenda recently approved by the European Parliament and now under review by the Council 
has proposed a number of short- and long-term solutions to be implemented, through the 
approval of individual law packages in the next few years. In the Agenda, the Commission 
recognizes the need to adopt a broader and decisive approach with respect to the common 
                                                
10 This analysis is of course coarse-grained. However, despite having a merely indicative function, it 
shows a significant increase in the general interest about the topic in question. 
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management of immigration. However, in order to be implemented, the Commission proposal 
must be approved by the European Council, constituted of the governments of Member States, 
which is the ultimate decision-making body of the EU. 
With respect to short-term measures, the most important is undoubtedly the adoption of an 
emergency scheme that will reallocate 160,000 people, from the most affected to other Member 
States, according to parameters such as GDP, unemployment rate and number of refugees 
accepted in previous years. This solution, according to the statements made by the Commission 
itself, will only be a forerunner to a permanent system of allocation aimed to share the burden 
and costs of the reception more fairly between the Member States. 
In this regard, we can notice that the approval of the first reallocation package, mainly forced 
by Germany, primarily represents a signal to European public opinion and to the Member States 
rather than a real solution to the emergence faced by the most exposed states. In fact, at the 
current rates, the number of refugees reallocated is lower than the number of asylum seekers 
arriving in Europe in a single month (Cerretelli, 2015), and therefore the mechanism cannot deal 
with the huge amount of potential refugees arriving at European borders. 
In addition, the allocation schemes will cover only the distribution of refugees who arrive 
irregularly on European territory crossing the borders of the peripheral States. Moreover, once 
relocated to different EU Member State, applicants will be still obliged to submit their request 
for asylum in the country in which they were relocated. 
Thus, the new system despite promising to resolve the problem from the states’ point of 
view, does not face the problem from the potential refugees’ perspective. The quota system 
could probably reduce the pressure of the accommodation costs imposed on the more exposed 
states, but would not solve the problem of the applicants’ inability to present their request in a 
Member State of their choice. Consequently, the quota system probably will leave unchanged 
the practice according to which refugees try to escape the registration upon arrival on European 
territory, trying to illegally reach, risking their lives, different Countries for their asylum 
application.  
Finally, it is important to stress that in light of the statements contrary to such a mechanism, 
expressed by several Member States, the approval of the permanent scheme appears to be quite 
uncertain.  
Concerning the long-term solutions, the European Agenda on Migration is organised around 
four pillars:11 
a) Broaden European activities: the first pillar concerns the reduction of incentives for 
irregular migration and specifically provides for the expansion of the role of EU 
delegations in strategic countries, namely the countries of origin and transit of asylum 
seekers, the increase of funds in favour of these countries, and more generally of the 
funds allocated for cooperation, and the intensification of the fight against trafficking 
and smuggling of migrants; 
                                                
11 European Commission, (2015). European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240, Brussels.  
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b) External borders: the second pillar relates to border management. This pillar provides 
for the strengthening of Frontex and the establishment of new forms of cooperation 
among the Member States. The Commission's intention is to create, during 2016, 
European legislation on border management that is able to increase the level of 
cooperation of the States in this area. 
c) Common asylum policy: the third pillar concerns the strengthening of the common 
asylum policy. The priority here is to ensure a consistent and homogeneous actuation of 
the CEAS through the creation of a new monitoring process. The Commission will also 
reinforce the use of infringement procedures toward the states that would not comply 
with the new European standards. 
d) Legal migration: the fourth pillar, in essence, aims at implementing a law that allows to 
manage the legal migration in a more streamlined way. 
Let us analyse in more detail the third pillar: honouring a moral duty to protect and a strong 
common European asylum.  
With respect to the implementation of a more rational and efficient common asylum policy, 
the Commission develops the third pillar in six points: 
1) New monitoring and evaluation system for the European common asylum standards and 
guidelines to improve reception conditions and asylum procedures, giving also priority 
to infringement procedures against those who fail to implement and enforce European 
law. 
2) Guidelines on the fight against abuses of the asylum system. 
3) Strengthening of provisions on the safe country of origin and of the directive procedures 
in order to faster the application process for asylum seekers arriving from such 
designated countries. 
4) Measures to promote the systematic identification and fingerprinting registration. 
5) More biometric identifiers in the Eurodac system. 
6) Review and possible revision of the Dublin Regulation in 2016. 
The strategy outlined by the Commission seems to address only in part the identified gaps. 
With respect to the allocation of asylum seekers and refugees, the agenda, as mentioned above, 
does not consider in any way their problem of the inability for asylum seekers to decide in 
which European country they present their asylum application. On the contrary, the 
Commission intends to strengthen the instruments such as Eurodac, ensuring that the rule of the 
first state of arrival will be respected in a more effective way, therefore, it does not seem to 
question this rule in any way. In addition, it will remain an impossibility for a person who has 
obtained refugee status to move freely within Europe. 
This last point seems in my opinion particularly contrasting with the desire to establish a 
“strong” common European asylum policy to enhance the protection of asylum seekers and 
refugees. A common European asylum system should imply that the decision of a Member State 
to grant refugee status to a subject should be automatically accepted by all Member States and 
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therefore a person who has been recognized as a refugee should have the opportunity to decide 
in which Member State to live. 
Such a policy would have several advantages and it might be useful to solve the problems 
highlighted. First, allowing refugees to choose where to stay once they get the status would 
partially eliminate the reasons why a number of refugees attempt to evade the controls upon 
arriving in European territory, thus avoiding the possibility of them being pushed toward the 
criminal networks involved in trying to reach a European country different from that of first 
arrival. Secondly, the authorization to move and to stay within all EU could facilitate 
employment and social integration of refugees. Being able to move freely, they could move to a 
Member State where there is less unemployment and more job offers. In addition, they could 
move to a Member State in which some acquaintances living there could help them to socially 
and economically integrate. Finally, such a choice would greatly facilitate family reunification, 
avoiding bureaucratic delays that currently can span across several months. 
With respect to the issue of the differences between the Member States in the treatment of 
asylum seekers and refugees, some of which we have seen are also linked to allocation issues, 
the Agenda seems to address this more effectively. 
The Commission assumes that, if applied, the rules concerning the treatment of asylum 
seekers and refugees, contained in the three procedures, reception and qualification directives, 
are in principle sufficient to ensure a harmonized approach between Member States. 
Consequently, the Agenda aims to strengthen its monitoring and evaluation system regarding 
the rules on reception conditions implemented by Member States to transpose European 
legislation and, to use the infringement procedure system more extensively towards the Member 
States showing a lack of implementation and enforcement. However, to determine the 
effectiveness of such an approach we should to wait until it is enforced and check how the 
Commission and the Council will decide to implement the Agenda’s program. 
The European Agenda on Migration is undoubtedly a good starting point, not only to address 
the immediate problem of the emergency, but also in an effort to create a rational and efficient 
European system, and thus eliminating gaps currently present in the legislation, particularly its 
implementation. In this sense, it is indeed a rather ambitious project. 
However, still in its embryonic stage, the Agenda has already met resistance from some 
Member States (such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Finland) in the 
implementation of the first legislative package concerning the reallocation of refugees. Similar 
resistance has appeared towards the implementation of a permanent quota system, especially 
with respect to the choice of the quota from which it would depend. 
In addition, the implementation of the Agenda is subjected to the approval of the legislative 
and operational measures required to attain the settled goals. From this point of view, to assess 
the effectiveness of the Agenda we will need to wait for the approval of legislative packages. 
Moreover, the attitude of many countries will give a direction in the roadmap to implement the 
Agenda.  
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5.	  A	  New	  European	  Citizenship	  for	  Refugees	  
As we said, there are significant gaps in the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees among 
different Member States, both in terms of reception, living conditions, rights, policies, and 
practices implemented in order to recognise or not international protection.  
This situation deserves careful consideration, especially considering a fundamental 
institution of the European system, i.e. the EU citizenship. Established in 1992 by the 
Maastricht Treaty, it does not replace national citizenship. On the contrary, as stated by the Art. 
9 of TEU, “it is added to national citizenship.” European citizenship emerges as partially 
opposed to the statist vision that considers citizenship as an exclusive emanation of a sovereign 
State. It opposes only “partially” because, it is still up to the "sovereign" Member States to 
establish the methods and procedures for the acquisition of national citizenship, which is a 
prerequisite to obtain the European citizenship. 
The concept of citizenship is linked to that of nationality and it is useful to distinguish the 
two concepts. Citizenship is defined as the legal relationship linking an individual to a particular 
jurisdiction (state), which recognises to the individual a set of rights related to the legal 
relationship between them. In other words, citizenship is a legal instrument by which a State 
recognises, to those classified as citizens, the entitlement of civil and political rights. The 
concept of nationality instead refers to the fact of belonging to a certain nation, where belonging 
is defined on the basis of historical, cultural, linguistic and religious characteristics. The concept 
of nationality indicates a bond that goes beyond the mere legal recognition and it is 
characterized in that a certain community of people feels somehow linked by common history, a 
common language, common culture or common values. 
According to Triggiani:  
“[the] great migration and the increasingly globalised human activity are gradually changing, in some 
cases making it the definitions of belonging and citizenship obsolete. The latter concept is evolving 
and becoming progressively [more] International, making inconsistent, so anachronistic, the 
correspondence between nationality and citizenship. One of the reasons behind this process comes 
from the “progressive achievement of acts and international instruments relating to fundamental 
human rights, which limit the absolute power of States to determine their own regulations on the 
assignment and denial or deprivation of nationality; acts and instruments that also give the foreigner 
an increasingly significant corpus of rights. (Trigiani, 2006).  
In other words, according to some authors, the development of international instruments that 
somehow limit the sovereign power of states, along with the process of globalization, are 
changing the classic link between the concepts of “nationality” and “citizenship”, marking a 
disjunction and widening the scope citizenship beyond national borders. 
The case of the EU is perhaps the most emblematic case with respect to this kind of changes. 
In the words of Nadia Urbinati “Europe has tried to become a new model of citizenship. This is 
one of the noblest ambitions of the European Union project. Theorists and lawyers have talked 
about a new paradigm of political freedom capable of decoupling citizenship from national 
belonging” (Urbinati, 2015). 
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However, at European level, the migration crisis and the unfavourable economic climate 
have slowed down this phenomenon. Nadia Urbinati nicely summarises this problem when she 
writes that: 
probing by the flow of migrants and the economic crisis, the European myth tarnishes. Nation states 
are returning as main players, the intergovernmental policy gains priority and with it the bilateral 
diplomacy; borders return to being closed […] the countries that are located on the borders of 
‘Fortress Europe’ become outposts in the rejection of the army of desperate people. Faced with 
landings of refugees in the world, Europe no longer seems certain to want to be the laboratory of a 
new nationality and addresses the issue of refugees as a national security issue and even as a war. 
(Urbinati, 2015). 
If so, what kind of citizenship is possible outside of the state space? Who are the possible 
subjects of this “extra-national” citizenship? 
Currently the EU does not provide a citizenship totally separated from nationality. At the 
present evolution of EU architecture, citizenship is conditional on the nationality of one of the 
Member States. 
On this issue, cosmopolitan literature offers a certain amount of writings and insights. 
Daniele Archibugi and other cosmopolitans argue that “The implication of the disconnection of 
citizenship from state nationality can become a starting point for a general policy that 
guarantees fundamental rights to individuals regardless of their nationality." (Archibugi et al., 
1998). The idea, essentially, is that of a cosmopolitan citizenship that "unify all human beings, 
which allows them to travel, visit and live in any corner of the world [...]” and the refugees 
seem to be the perfect category for this idea of citizenship because “being citizens of nowhere, 
they are potentially world's citizens.” (Archibugi, 2008). 
Following the cosmopolitan line of thought, the partial disjunction between citizenship and 
nationality that occurred with the introduction of European citizenship could become a starting 
point to imagine the implementation of a system granting certain rights regardless of the 
individual nationality so that it could be applied to refugees. 
The cosmopolitan vision, perhaps too ambitious when it postulates the creation of a world 
citizenship totally divorced from the individual's nationality, could be partly applied to the case 
of the EU, at least to a specific category, namely, refugees. As well, such an approach could be 
considered consistent with the process that the EU actually has already started, which is that to 
establish a sui generis transnational citizenship that brings with it certain rights. The idea of an 
innovative European citizenship to be conferred on humanitarian grounds would make Europe 
an entity at the forefront of the protection of fundamental human rights by subverting part of the 
cardinal principle of the concept of citizenship, namely the exclusivity. 
5.1	  A	  “Strong”	  Common	  European	  Asylum	  
The Agenda, however, is a good starting point for the implementation of a true common 
European asylum policy. However, to eliminate the gap highlighted above, further steps, 
without a doubt, could and should be undertaken. 
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In the first place, in the absence of a reform of the treaties that revises the rule of the first 
country of arrival, one should try to eliminate the underlying causes of the attempts of refugees 
to escape this rule. The choice of the Commission to strengthen the control on the application of 
EU law and to appeal more broadly to the tool of the infringement procedure is a good starting 
point, but as we have seen, it is not enough. Regardless of the control, in fact, some member 
states will continue to provide more opportunities and guarantees through the implementation of 
well-structured programs of proven effectiveness, as in the case of Sweden12, and this will 
provide an incentive to asylum seekers to try to reach these countries. 
A viable solution would be a partial reform of the directives adopting in all member states a 
common program built on the good practices put in place by the best performing Countries 
including policies to support both economic and social integration. 
Such an approach, in conjunction with of a quota system for the allocation of asylum seekers 
and a better monitoring of the compliance with European standards, would be able to solve, at 
least partially, both the allocation problem and the problem of the treatment. 
Second, the need to begin to consider the allocation problem not only from the point of view 
of the States but also from the point of view of the refugees is becoming increasingly clear. As 
well as solving the problem of the different treatment of asylum seekers and refugees among 
Member States, there are still other reasons why the refugees escape the system trying to reach 
other Countries rather than that of first arrival, doing so relying on human traffickers. 
In this case, a solution could be precisely the establishment of a European citizenship for 
refugees. Once resolved or greatly mitigated the problem of differences of treatment, the 
establishment of such an instrument would reduce to zero, or at least to reduce to a minimum, 
the incentives for refugees to escape the Dublin System. In other words, while maintaining the 
rule of the first country of arrival, when an applicant is expected to find similar conditions 
among Member States— with respect to rates of applications acceptance, timing for procedures 
completion, reception conditions during the application process and, economic and social 
assistance conditions once achieved the status— much of the incentives to evade the system 
would vanish. If one add to this picture the opportunity to move into the European territory once 
refugee status is acquired, the applicant would have no more incentives. In such a context, 
indeed, he/she could move to his/her family, easily reach any friends or relatives (excluded by 
the current definition of family and therefore with no possibility to be reached with the current 
tool of family reunification), move to a Country of which he/she knows the language, or move 
to a Country where job opportunities are greater. 
5.2	  European	  Citizenship	  for	  Refugees:	  Implementation	  
In the previous sections, we have seen how, by establishing a European citizenship, the EU 
has partly operated a disjunction between the concepts of citizenship and that of nationality. 
                                                
12 Euractive, (September 22, 2015). Asylum systems in Europe remain disparate. URL: 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/asylum-systems-europe-remain-disparate-317822. 
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This disjunction however is only partial since European citizenship remains subjected to the 
possession of the nationality of a Member State. 
As provided by the Treaties, European citizenship adds a number of additional rights to the 
rights already conferred by the possession of the nationality of a Member State. These rights 
are: freedom of movement and residence throughout the EU; the active and passive right to vote 
in local elections and European elections in the Member State of residence; the protection by the 
diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State in a third country in which the State of 
which the person concerned is a national is not represented; the right to petition to the European 
Parliament and to complaint to the Ombudsman13. 
A similar argument could be applied to the case of refugees. European citizenship for 
refugees might be thought as a temporary citizenship conditioned to the possession of the 
refugee status. In other words, in this case, European citizenship would not be linked to the 
nationality of the subject but to the refugee status, which currently entitles the person who 
possess it to stay in the territory of the Member State that has granted the status. It would also 
be temporary in the sense that the refugee would lose it when he would be no longer in 
possession of the refugee status for one of the grounds specified in the European standards. 
Which rights to associate with this form of citizenship is a matter of debate. One might 
decide to guarantee the same rights as those granted by European citizenship to nationals of 
Member States; or one may instead decide to cover only certain rights deemed to be essential. 
For example, this form of citizenship may exclude the recognition of the right to vote, but 
recognize welfare and education related rights. In any case, the minimum fundamental right 
linked to this form of European citizenship should include temporary freedom of movement and 
residence throughout the European Union. 
Such a choice, as we pointed out above, would imply a number of advantages for both 
Member States and asylum seekers and refugees. In addition, it would be easily manageable 
from an EU perspective. Once registered in the Eurodac database, which includes a set of 
biometric parameters aimed at registering asylum seekers and refugees, the ability to move 
within the EU would not create any particular management or public security problem. 
Finally, from the economic point of view, such a policy could be coupled by a greater 
financial engagement of the EU in sharing the costs deriving from the management of asylum 
seekers and refugees. This could be done through the establishment of a compensation fund 
aimed at supporting those Member States which have to manage larger number of refugees. 
Such a compensation fund could be made up by EU founds raised through the establishment of 
a special "European tax for Refugees", to be taken from Member States, and calculated in a 
progressive manner based on parameters such as GDP per capita, public debt, unemployment 
and other economic parameters and, could be distributed annually and proportionally to the 
number of refugees already accommodated. 
                                                
13 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union d (TFEU) arts. 20-25, 
December 13, 2007. 
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A system reformed in this way would represent a huge step forward in improving the 
common European management of asylum and would probably be more consistent with the 
principles of democracy and rule of law that underpin the EU itself. 
Conclusions	  
The issues of immigration and asylum have been in recent months at the centre stage of the 
European political debate. This extremely fluid situation, both in the political and the legislative 
discussions, makes it quite complicated to make a precise analysis of the policies proposed and 
implemented, at a national and European level, to address the problem. Recently both the 
Governments of Member States and the European institutions have discussed the problem by 
proposing solutions, taking actions and positions somewhat uneven. 
However, an analysis of the European legislation and practices related to the Dublin system 
allowed us to identify and isolate the major problems inherent in the current European Common 
Asylum System: the allocation problem and the problem of the conditions of asylum seekers 
and refugees. 
In the analysis of these problems, I pointed out how they have both a legislative and 
applicative nature and, in addition, are bound to each other in that the former is in part 
dependent on the latter. Then I have analysed the European Agenda on Migration, the main tool 
that EU has developed in the effort to reform the system and to create the conditions for the 
implementation of a migration policy more effective and efficient in the long run. 
However, the analysis showed us how the Agenda addresses only in part the gaps that we 
have pointed out in the analysis of the current European legislation. In particular, while 
promising to settle the allocation problem from the states’ point of view, the Agenda fails to 
address it from the point of view of potential refugees. The quota system can reduce the 
economic and social pressure imposed on the more exposed States, but cannot solve the 
problem of the applicant inability to present its request in a Member State of his choice. The 
quota system probably will leave unchanged the practice whereby refugees are trying to escape 
the controls upon arrival on European territory to try to reach, in a clandestine way and risking 
their lives, a different country for their request for asylum. 
With respect to the issue of the differences between Member States in the treatment of 
asylum seekers and refugees, the Agenda seems to address the issue more effectively. The 
Commission assumes the premise that if the rules concerning the treatment of asylum seekers 
and refugees were to be applied, this would be sufficient to ensure a harmonized approach 
among Member States. For this reason, the solution presented by the Agenda is to strengthen 
the monitoring and evaluation system of the EU rules implemented by States and to use more 
extensively the infringement procedure towards those Member States failing to transpose and to 
enforce them. However, the implementation of the Agenda is subject to the approval of the 
legislative and operational measures required to attain the goals. From this point of view, in 
order to assess the effectiveness of the Agenda, we need to wait for the approval of legislative 
packages essential to its implementation. 
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Finally, I presented a concrete suggestion to reduce, if not eliminate, the gaps showed in the 
EU asylum management. Since the problem of the conditions of asylum seekers and refugees 
appear to be satisfactorily addressed by the Agenda, my proposal focuses on the allocation 
problem. Assuming that the quota system alone is not sufficient to fully solve the problem, I 
proposed the establishment of a European citizenship for refugees. 
Such a European citizenship for refugees might be thought as a temporary citizenship 
conditioned to the possession of the refugee status. In other words, European citizenship would 
not be linked to the nationality of the subject (as in the case of EU Member States’ citizens) but 
to the refugee status, which currently entitles the person who possess it to reside in the territory 
of the Member State that has granted it. It would also be temporary in the sense that the refugee 
would lose it in case they were no longer in possession of the refugee status on one of the 
grounds specified by the European standards. At this particular type of citizenship, one may 
apply different rights, for instance the same rights as guaranteed by European citizenship to 
nationals of Member States, or just a subset of those rights deemed essential. With regard to the 
problems of the European legislation on asylum, it may be sufficient to connect to European 
citizenship for refugees only the freedom of movement and residence throughout the EU. 
Such a policy would have several advantages. First, allowing refugees to choose where to 
stay once they got the status would partially eliminate the reasons why a number of refugees 
attempting to evade the registration once arrived on European territory, thus avoiding being 
pushed toward criminal networks in the attempt to reach a different country. Secondly, the 
authorization to move and to stay within the entire European territory could facilitate 
employment and social integration. Being able to move freely, they could move to a Member 
State where there is less unemployment and more job offer, or simply in a Member State in 
which may reside any acquaintances who could help them to socially and economically 
integrate in a given Country. Finally, such a choice would greatly facilitate family reunification, 
avoiding delays that often span several months. 
A policy designed in this way should be accompanied by a greater financial engagement of 
the EU in sharing the cost deriving from the management of refugees. This could be done 
through the establishment of a compensation fund aimed at supporting those Member States 
which have to manage larger number of refugees. Such a compensation could be distributed 
annually and accordingly to the number of refugees previously accommodated and other 
economic parameters such as GDP, unemployment rate and public debt magnitude. A system so 
reformed would represent a huge step forward in the achievement of a genuine common 
European asylum management that would be more consistent with the principles of democracy 
and rule of law underpinning the EU itself. 
A European citizenship for refugees would obviously not solve all the problems caused by 
the exceptional nature of migration flows across Europe. To solve these problems, one should 
address the original causes pushing such many people to flee their own countries and to address 
long and risky trips in the attempt to reach Europe. These causes —wars, extreme poverty, 
situations of gross and systematic violations of human rights and natural disasters— could be 
partly addressed on the part of EU Member States if they showed a willing to move towards a 
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greater integration of their foreign policies. And since these problems are international in nature, 
they should be addressed not only by the EU but by the entire international community. 
European citizenship for refugees would make the asylum seekers more dignified, enabling 
them to choose the Country in which to settle and start their own new lives. 
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Appendix	  
Table	  4:	  Number	  of	  refugees	  in	  Europe	  in	  2013	  divided	  by	  country	  of	  residence	  and	  its	  percentage	  of	  the	  total.	  
Country	   Refugees	   Percentage	  
France	   232487	   23.70%	  
Germany	  	   187567	   19.12%	  
United	  Kingdom	  	   126055	   12.85%	  
Sweden	   114175	   11.64%	  
Italy	   78061	   7.96%	  
Netherland	  	   74707	   7.62%	  
Austria	  	   55598	   5.67%	  
Belgium	   25633	   2.61%	  
Poland	   16438	   1.68%	  
Denmark	  	   13170	   1.34%	  
Finland	  	   11252	   1.15%	  
Malta	  	   9906	   1.01%	  
Ireland	   6001	   0.61%	  
Spain	   4637	   0.47%	  
Bulgaria	  	   4320	   0.44%	  
Cyprus	   3883	   0.40%	  
Greece	   3485	   0.36%	  
Czech	  Republic	   3184	   0.32%	  
Luxembourg	   2873	   0.29%	  
Hungary	   2440	   0.25%	  
Romania	  	   1770	   0.18%	  
Lithuania	   916	   0.09%	  
Slovakia	   701	   0.07%	  
Croatia	   684	   0.07%	  
Portugal	   598	   0.06%	  
Slovenia	  	   213	   0.02%	  
Latvia	  	   160	   0.02%	  
Estonia	  	   70	   0.01%	  
Total	  EU	   980.984	   100%	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  on	  Data:	  UNHCR,	  The	  2013	  in	  numbers.	  
https://www.unhcr.it/sites/53a161110b80eeaac7000002/assets/53c9265e0b80eea03a0078e3/IL_2013_IN_CIFRE.p
df.	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Table	  5:	  Total	  of	  applications	  submitted	  and	  of	  those	  accepted,	  the	  percentage	  of	  applications	  accepted,	  
the	  population	  and	  the	  GDP	  per	  capita	  of	  the	  different	  EU	  Member	  States,	  year	  2014.	  
Country	   Application	  Submitted14	   Acceptance	  Rate15	   Total	  Population16	   PIL	  Per-­‐Capita17	  
Germany	  	   202645	   20.0	   82531671	   47822	  
Sweden	   81180	   37.8	   9482855	   58939	  
Italy	   64625	   31.8	   59394207	   34909	  
France	   64310	   23.0	   65327724	   42733	  
Hungary	   42775	   1.2	   9932000	   14029	  
United	  Kingdom	   32785	   30.7	   63456584	   46332	  
Austria	   28035	   17.5	   8443018	   51191	  
Netherlands	   24495	   51.2	   16730348	   52172	  
Belgium	   22710	   35.4	   11094850	   47353	  
Denmark	   14680	   37.3	   5573894	   60707	  
Bulgaria	   11080	   63.2	   7327224	   7851	  
Greece	   9430	   20.9	   11290067	   21498	  
Poland	   8020	   9.0	   38538	   14343	  
Spain	   5615	   28.2	   46196276	   29767	  
Finland	   3620	   35.1	   5401267	   49824	  
Cyprus	   1745	   57.0	   862011	   27194	  
Romania	   1545	   47.9	   21355849	   9997	  
Ireland	   1450	   27.6	   4582707	   54374	  
Malta	   1350	   93.3	   417546	   22776	  
Luxembourg	   1150	   10.4	   524853	   116664	  
Czech	  Republic	   1145	   32.8	   10505445	   19530	  
Croatia	   450	   5.6	   4398150	   13475	  
Lithuania	   440	   15.9	   3003641	   16507	  
Portugal	   440	   9.1	   10542398	   22132	  
Slovenia	   385	   11.7	   2055496	   23999	  
Latvia	   375	   6.7	   2041763	   15719	  
Slovakia	   330	   51.5	   5404322	   18501	  
Estonia	   155	   12.9	   1294486	   20162	  
European	   Union	  
(28	  countries)	  
626965	   	   469209190	   	  
Average	   22392	   29.5	   	   34304	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  on	  Eurostat	  data.	  The	  yellow	  coloured	  lines	  show	  the	  Countries	  with	  a	  GDP	  per	  capita	  
above	  the	  EU	  average.	  
                                                
14 Original data: URL http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:First_instance_decisions_on_%28non-
EU%29_asylum_applications,_2014_%28number,_rounded_figures%29_YB15_IV.png. 
15 Original data: URL http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do 
16 Original data: URL 
data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOT?end=2014&start=2013&view=map&year=2015 
17 Original data: URL http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD	  
